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INTRODUCTION: THE DREAM CONFRONTS
REALITY
"How long will you keep killing people?" asked Lady Astor of Stalin in
1931. Replied Stalin, "The process would continue as long as was
necessary" to establish a communist society.1
For decades, international lawyers, diplomats, and statesmen have
worked to create a permanent international court to prosecute war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Efforts to create such a court,
however, floundered on the rocky shoals of the Cold War. The end of
the Cold War rekindled the hope such a court could actually become
a reality. Indeed, that hope became reality in July of 1998 when most
of the nations of the world met in Rome and voted on a statute that
would create a new International Criminal Court ("ICC").
Proponents hailed the new court as "a giant step forward" in
furtherance of human rights and the rule of law.
The United States, as well as most countries of the world, long
supported the concept of a permanent, sitting international criminal
court. Indeed, the Clinton Administration emphasized its support for
the concept on numerous occasions before the Rome Conference
convened.2 And yet, at the conclusion of the Conference, the United
States, along with six other states, voted against the establishment of'
1. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 79 (1994).
2. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 12-14 (1999) (discussing the United States' role in
supporting and drafting the statue for the ICC prior to the Rome Conference).
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the new court.' Many condemned the United States for doing so,
calling it an abandonment of the rule of law and the pursuit of
justice.
This essay will explain that the proposed ICC is fundamentally
flawed and suffers from the unintended consequences of making
justice and peace harder to achieve. Simply put, it will not stop the
next Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, or Pol Pot. Instead, it will likely rob
nations of their sovereignty, impose new standards of law based on
the whim of activist judges, and eliminate other more viable options
for achieving peace and social justice. Nations that embrace this
court should do so only after careful review and after acknowledging
that they are, in effect, agreeing to cede their sovereignty over their
own court systems and notions of justice to a supra-national tribunal.
The new court will pass judgment on the practice of nations and
inevitably force them to adhere to concepts of international law
either previously rejected or inconsistent with the customary practice
of nations. This essay argues the International Criminal Court puts at
risk the ultimate objective of peace at the unacceptable cost of a
nation's sovereign rights.
I. THE LIGHT THAT FAILED: THE GENESIS OF
THE ICC
In the civilized world's box of foreign policy tools. [the International
Criminal Court] will be the shiny new hammer to swing in the years
ahead.
-David J. Scheffer, U.S. Representative to Rome Conference'
War crimes trials, or attempts to create them, are not new. The
genesis of war crimes tribunals, and the long-stated goal of
establishing an international criminal court, is the liberal democratic
belief in universal rights not bound by geography, borders, or
3. See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Co;ference for an International
Crimzinal Court, 1998 ASIL INSIGHTS, available at http:Iwww.asil.org (stating
that U.S., China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen opposed the Rome Statute,
while twenty-one other states abstained).
4. David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, FOREIGN POL'Y 34,
51(1996).
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cultures.5 In addition to the current tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, there are at least five other instances in recent history where
states debated the efficacy of such efforts.6 Following the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials, the newly constituted United Nations ("U.N.")
created an International Law Commission ("ILC") to examine the
possibility of establishing a permanent international criminal
tribunal.7 In the 1950s, the ILC produced two draft statutes, but the
tensions of the Cold War resulted in little progress and no serious
interest in such a court.8
In 1989, the U.N. delegation from Trinidad and Tobago
reintroduced the idea of establishing an international tribunal to
address the growing worldwide threat of international drug
trafficking. 9 The ILC submitted a draft to the U.N. General Assembly
in 1994. Subsequently, in 1996, the U.N. General Assembly allowed
the establishment of a Preparatory Committee to work on the
5. See generally, STANLEY HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON TilE
LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1981) (exploring
the nexus between morality and international affairs); ROBERT L. HOLMES, ON
WAR AND MORALITY (1989) (assessing role of morality in international relations
and arguing that no modem warfare is morally justifiable); JAMES T. JOINSON.
JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL
INQUIRY (1981) (discussing codification of "just war" theory in international law).
6. See generally GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE (2000)
(recounting historical attempts to try war criminals). Other less well-known cases
include the United States and British setting up war crimes trials after the Spanish-
American War and the Boer War, respectively. These include the abortive treason
trials of Bonapartists in 1815: the botched trials of German war criminals afler
WWI, to include an attempt to try the Kaiser; attempts at prosecuting some of the
Young Turk perpetrators of the Armenian genocide; the Nuremberg trials of Nazi
war criminals; and the prosecution of Japanese war criminals at the Tokyo
international military tribunal. Id.
7. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Cottrts: the Legacy of
Nuremburg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203, 225 (1998) [hereinafter Ferencz, Legacy
of Nuremnbe-g] (discussing the impetus for creating a permanent international
criminal court); see generally BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE (1980) (detailing the historical
development of the ICC).
8. See Ferencz, Legacy of Nurembeg, sup-a note 7, at 218 (setting the
historical context for the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court).
9. Id. at 225.
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creation of an international criminal court.'" Two years later, the
committee, with the participation of over ninety countries and
numerous nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), submitted a
revised ILC draft statute. Despite the fact that there were large
areas of disagreement over the complex one hundred sixty-seven
page draft statute (there were approximately fifteen hundred sections
or parts that remained in dispute), the U.N. General Assembly
nevertheless agreed to convene a conference in June 1998 to
negotiate and approve a statute to create a new international criminal
court.12
In just five weeks during the summer of 1998, one hundred sixty
of the world's nations gathered in Rome to debate, refine, and agree
on a final implementing statute for an international criminal court.'
At the beginning, it did not appear the delegates could agree on the
numerous unresolved issues, let alone finalize a statute to establish
the court. By the end of the conference, significant disagreements
over jurisdictional issues, definitions of crimes, the role of the
Security Council, and referrals to the court continued to separate the
delegations. 4 Last minute deals and behind-the-scenes maneuvering
resulted in a document few delegations fully read or understood.
Further, unlike other treaty conferences of this magnitude, the
procedural rules were changed to allow voting instead of the usual
agreement by consensus. 5 Despite the concerns over many aspects
and specific details of the proposed court, a large number of like-
10. See id. at 226 (explaining the evolution of the ICC).
11. See Report of the Preparator' Conunittee on the Establishment of" an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Preparatory Committee, 61st Meeting, at 2,
168, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/2/Add.1, (1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc
(proposing a draft statute and draft final act on the establishment of the ICC).
12. See Press Release, United Nations, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes
in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court,
L/ROM/22 (July 17, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom22.htm (detailing the unresolved issues in the
Rome Statute).
13. See id. (noting events of the Rome Conference).
14. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 4
(1999) (discussing contentious issues of Rome Conference).
15. See id.
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minded states-aided and abetted by thirty-three intergovernmental
organizations and a coalition of roughly one hundred twenty-four
NGOs-resolved at all costs to have the conference agree on an ICC,
even if all the details could not be worked out in time.'6 Objections
and concerns over moving too fast were brushed aside in an almost
religious zeal. The U.S. delegate to the Conference described it this
way:
The process launched in the final forty-eight hours of the Rome
Conference minimized the chances that these proposals and amendments
to the text that the U.S. delegation had submitted in good faith could be
seriously considered by delegations. The treaty text was subjected to a
mysterious, closed-door and exclusionary process of revision by a small
number of delegates, mostly from the like-minded group, who cut deals to
attract certain wavering governments into supporting a text that was
produced at 2:00 a.m. on the final day of the conference, July 17. This
"take it or leave it" text for a permanent institution of law was not
subjected to rigorous review ... and was rushed to adoption hours later
on the evening of July 17 without debate.
17
These like-minded state delegations were so desperate and
determined to create an international criminal court they were
prepared to agree to the draft statute no matter what the defects or
potential problems. Certain provisions were never openly discussed,
and no nation's delegation had time to undertake a rigorous review
of the final full text.'
8
Reflecting on these last minute, middle of the night maneuvers by
ICC zealots reminds one of Bismarck's often quoted aphorism: "[i]f
you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being
made.' 9 Whether such maneuvers reflect a principled method for
16. See Scharf, supra note 3 (explaining that groups actively participated in the
conference while only states were allowed to vote, but noting many states adopted
verbatim the arguments and statements of these groups).
17. See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 20; see also Press Release, supra note 12
(showing that Israel and Singapore expressed similar concerns as the United States
with respect to the last minute frenzy by some delegations to ratify the statute,
despite its deficiencies).
18. See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 20 (describing the inadequate review and
negotiation process of the draft statute prior to its ratification).
19. RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED
FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 190 (Library of Congress,
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treaty construction is arguably debatable. This holds particularly true
with regards to the creation of a new international tribunal that is
fundamentally flawed and will have extraordinary powers with the
capability of dictating its will to independent and sovereign states.
II. THE CASE FOR THE COURT - POINT AND
COUNTERPOINT
FIAT JUSTITIA ET PEREAT MUNDUS (LET JUSTICE BE DONE, THOUGH TIlE
WORLD PERISH) 
20
Justice in the life and conduct of the state is possible only as it first
resides in the hearts and souls of its citizens.
21
The Secretary General of the U.N. called the establishment of a
permanent ICC "the promise of universal justice."' Human rights
activists and proponents of war crimes tribunals proclaimed a wide
array of lofty objectives for the ICC. These include, but are not
limited to, the claim that such tribunals will bring justice, establish
peace, establish new international norms for the betterment of all,
and ultimately outlaw war altogether. Many NGOs accept such
sweeping claims as a kind of orthodoxy, despite the absence of any
supporting empirical evidence. On the contrary, the notion that war
crimes trials are always appropriate should raise skepticism for many
reasons. For example, due process may interfere with substantive
justice through technical acquittals and delays in punishing the
guilty. Also, foreign-imposed trials may cause a nationalist backlash,
as is currently in evidence in Serbia. Or, a moralistic insistence on
punishing war crimes may make it impossible to deal with
bloodstained leaders who, however repulsive, have the capacity to
end a war. This essay proffers that when politics is linked to law,
Congressional Reference Division ed., 1989).
20. Motto of the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand 1 (1503-1564), COLUMBIA
WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (1996), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/66/96/21998.html.
21. Dr. H. B. Alexander, Inscription over the 10' street entrance of the U.S.
Department of Justice Building, Washington, D.C.
22. Kofi Annan, Advocating for an International Criminal Court, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 363, 366 (1997).
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crucial flexibility is lost-with potentially catastrophic results.
ICC advocates argue that the benefits of war crimes tribunals in
general, and the ICC in particular, outweigh these potential costs and
any perceived flaws in the ICC itself." They argue that war crimes
tribunals will achieve peace and justice in six key ways: (1)purging
threatening enemy leaders; (2)deterring war criminals;
(3)rehabilitating former enemy countries; (4)individualizing blame
for atrocities rather than condemning an entire ethnic group;
(5)establishing the truth about wartime atrocities; and (6)averting
retribution. Upon closer examination, however, there is little
evidence to support these contentions. Conversely, to the extent that
one can give weight to any of them, the costs far exceed the
perceived benefits. Only the hopes of those who see the current
international state-centric system as obsolete and an obstacle to
world peace support these "justifications."
A. PURGING DESPOTS, MADMEN, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
PARIAHS
Granted, purging threatening leaders can be an important part of
reforming a conquered country, but it oftentimes requires a serious
military commitment to ride out the nationalist backlash set off by
foreign-imposed justice. Additionally, it is never enough just to
target the leaders. For public attitudes to shift, criminal leaders must
be tried-their aura of mystery shattered by showing their weakness
and stupidity, and their prestige deflated by the humiliation of
standing in the dock. However, this only works in a situation such as
post World War II ("WWII") Germany, where there was an absence
of any opposition to the trials and, ultimately, a national renunciation
of Nazism. If the opposition remains strong and the intent is (or is
perceived as being) punitive rather than rehabilitative, then there is
less likelihood of success. Backlash and the potential of attacks on
occupying soldiers become significant concerns as the trials
23. See generally Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-Gencral Says
Establishment of International Criminal Court Is Major Step in March Towards
Universal Human Rights, Rule of Law, L/ROM/23 (July 18, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom23.htm (praising the creation of the CC and
noting that it will "have unquestioned authority and the widest possible
jurisdiction").
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themselves are perceived as nothing more than show trials.
In Bosnia, the ad hoc war crimes tribunal is an example of how a
decision to detach war crimes from the underlying political reality
advances neither the goal of a political resolution nor the goal of
punishment for war criminals. Unlike Nuremberg, in Bosnia, there
are no clear winners and no clear losers. Indeed, in many respects the
war in Bosnia is no more over than it is in other parts of the former
Yugoslavia. Thus, the future status of the warring parties, their
respective politico-military postures, and their levels of political
support are far from clear. Their prior leaders, or those closely
associated to them, are still in power and likely to remain so for the
foreseeable future.
Significantly, there is no agreement-among any of the parties
inside or outside Bosnia-about how the Yugoslav tribunal fits into
the overall political disagreement and its potential resolution. Indeed,
Bosnia is a case study of how insisting on making legal process a
higher priority than the political resolution of a dysfunctional society
can adversely affect both the legal and political sides of the equation.
It is far from clear that war crimes trials will result in the expiation of
wartime hostilities. Press reporting over the years since the creation
of the Yugoslav tribunal seems to show almost without contradiction
that Serbs regard the tribunal as hopelessly biased against them. This
belief reaffirms the long-standing Serbian view that they, as a people,
are not understood or appreciated. Croats are outraged with the
indictments of some of their people, because the indictments
implicitly equate them with the Serbs. Finally, the Bosnian Muslims
view the whole process as inadequately vindicating their claims of
oppression at the hands of both the Serbs and the Croats.-"
Very much unlike Nuremberg, much of the Yugoslav war crimes
process seems to be about score settling rather than a more
disinterested purging of war criminals that purports to contribute to
political reconciliation. The Serbs believe they are being unfairly
treated and hold this view strongly. Consequently, the "search for
justice" harms the cause of Bosnian national reconciliation. Under
24. See Amra Kebo & Patrick Bishop, Haunted by the Ghosts of Srebrenica
Three Years On, Families Still Grieve for the Thousands Huntel to Death by the
Serbs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 10, 1998, at 20 (describing the carnage of the
massacre and the lack of justice as perceived by the victims' families).
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the circumstances, it is hard to see how an independent ICC would
fare much better.
B. DETERRING WAR CRIMINALS
Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, has argued that:
In former Yugoslavia, each time the prospects of punishing war criminals
has been publicized, the treatment of detainees has improved and
atrocities have diminished. Today, there are signs that some of the worst
violators of human rights are being deprived of their authority by one-
time protectors who now fear justice under the law. In short, the more
serious we are about the Tribunal, the greater the potential deterrent the
Tribunal will be.
2 5
The U.N. further proclaims, "[o]nce it is clear that the
international community will no longer tolerate such monstrous acts
without assigning responsibility and meting out appropriate
punishment ... it is hoped that those who would incite a genocide
[and other crimes against humanity] will no longer find willing
helpers. 26
Despite these claims, there is little evidence to support the
contention that war crimes tribunals have had a deterrent effect,
either in the near or long-term. Even the best-established domestic
legal systems are incapable of deterring all murderers, or even petty
thieves for that matter. War crimes tribunals face a far greater
challenge. These tribunals are meant to deal with the bloodiest of
crimes; men willing to commit mass murder are terribly difficult to
dissuade. Such a regime will not be deterred by anything short of
substantial military force, and maybe not even that. Although some
less ideological regimes may be deterred by the threat of war crimes
prosecutions, those bent on mass slaughter historically simply
shrugged off such warnings. When legal threats finally arrive, the
25. See Madeleine Albright, Bosnia in Light of the Holocaust: War Crimes
Trials, Address at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Apr. 12, 1994) (arguing
for a long-term global deterrent: "[i]f the architects of war and ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia go unpunished, the lesson for would-be Milosevic's around the world will
endanger us all").
26. See United Nations, Overview of Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html
(providing an overview of the development and provisions of the Rome Statute).
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mass killings are well underway, so the accused are already
criminally liable and, thus, think they have nothing to gain by
stopping the slaughter. Conceivably, some lower-level thugs may be
cowed, especially if military threats accompany the legal ones, but
experience shows that threats of prosecution are unlikely to sway
genocidal regimes. Again, the Bosnian example is instructive.
The Yugoslav tribunal did not substantially dissuade war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1992, for instance, the U.N.
warned Bosnian Serb leaders that expelling Muslims and Croats was
a war crime to no avail .2 The fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, with
the subsequent massacre of at least seven thousand Bosnian
Muslims, 28 was the most dramatic failure in Bosnia. It occurred two
years after the creation of the tribunal, and shortly after it became
clear that the tribunal was about to indict those responsible.
Likewise, specific threats from The Hague did not stop President
Slobodan Milosevic's forces in 1999 from committing mass killings
and expulsions in Kosovo. Indeed, as a former defense counsel in
The Hague noted, "No criminal justice system is going to stop crime.
It can only curb it. And what crimes might have been committed that
weren't committed obviously it's impossible to say." -9
Indictments of the International Criminal Court will not deter
Saddam Hussein or the next Pol Pot any more than the Yugoslav
War Crimes Tribunal deterred Bosnian Serb strongmen from
massacring the innocent. The ICC may issue indictments, but unless
war criminals are defeated and stripped of power, it is unlikely they
will be brought to justice, at least in the near term. Worse,
indictments may further entrench a powerful despot, in light of the
absence of any incentive to support a peace or the transition to
democracy.
27. See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH 01: A NATION
248 (1997) (describing the role of U.N. officials in attempting to terminate ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia).
28. See JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A
WAR CRIME 175-85 (1996) (explaining the U.N.'s failure to intervene and end the
massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica).
29. Personal correspondence from Lee Casey, former defense counsel in The
Hague, to author (Jan. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
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C. REHABILITATING "RENEGADE" STATES
This justification also lacks in the way of empirical evidence to
support the claim that international crimes against humanity or war
crimes trials will provide the needed catharsis to a nation and its
people torn asunder by conflict or intolerable oppression. Certainly,
if Germany is the best-case scenario, one must be modest about one's
hopes for a quick rehabilitation. It is not that tribunals have no
positive effect, but that the effect is far from decisive and certainly
not quick. The popular image of Nuremberg as a lightning catharsis,
transforming Germany at a stroke from a thoroughly Nazi country to
a penitent democratic one, is a myth. Instead, the Nuremberg
experience suggests that, at best, war crimes tribunals are not a quick
fix, but rather a small part of a much more ambitious and time-
consuming social engineering project-a prospect that few nations
are willing to undertake.
Transformation to representative government and concomitant
respect for human rights is not a result or by-product of war crimes
trials. So far, with the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals, observers
view the effect of such trials more as victors' justice or vengeance.
That being the case, one would be hard pressed to find any
rehabilitative effect. Indeed, the Yugoslav Tribunal's chief
prosecutor's insistence that Serbia immediately "extradite
somebody," and the new government's dismissal of domestic trials
for war crimes caused Serbs to view those extradited as "martyrs,"
creating a general feeling of persecution among Serbs." There is,
however, overwhelming evidence to conclude that the way to end
war crimes and other atrocities is "through restricting and checking
power that is, through fostering democratic freedoms." "'
30. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Yugoslav Leaders Resist Denand for Extradition,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2001, at A13 (reporting that many Yugoslav officials oppose
Serbian prosecutions in an international forum and prefer to try former dictators
domestically when the nation is more receptive to the notion).
31. See RUMMEL, supra note 1, at 17 (cataloguing evidence that undemocratic
state regimes with arbitrary power commit human rights violations, Rummel
argues that, "as the arbitrary power of a regime increases massively, that is, as we
move from democratic through authoritarian to totalitarian regimes, the amount of
killing [by the state] jumps by huge multiples").
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D. ENDING IMPUNITY: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
Former Secretary of State Albright declared that "responsibility
for [war] crimes does not rest with the Serbs or Croats or Muslims as
peoples; it rests with the people who ordered and committed the
crimes. The wounds opened by this war will heal much faster if
collective guilt for atrocities is expunged and individual
responsibility is assigned. 3 2 This is, of course, an extremely difficult
task. After a war or mass slaughter, the massive number of
perpetrators overwhelms the capacity of any legal institution. No
tribunal ever seriously contemplated prosecuting more than a fraction
of the guilty individuals, so trials tend not to put the blame where it
fairly belongs. Of course, if one does not want to conduct hundreds
or thousands of trials, or declare whole organizations criminal (as
was done in Nuremberg), then a legal approach will necessarily let
off large numbers of war criminals. At best, a war crimes tribunal
will punish the guiltiest. No state has ever contemplated catching
every war criminal, however much each criminal may deserve it. For
example, there are an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 murderers in the
Rwandan genocide. But as one critic noted, "[s]ince it would be mad
to add a second genocide to the first, it is out of the question to kill
all the killers. But the desire for vengeance can be assuaged if the
real organizers, the 'big people' go to the gallows."' The Bosnian
Serb soldiers who fired shells indiscriminately into Tuzla or Zepa are
war criminals. The snipers in the hills around Sarajevo are war
criminals. They are unlikely ever to be tried by any tribunal, and
certainly not by the Yugoslav tribunal, which, to date, only publicly
indicted eighty-one men.
On the other hand, war crimes tribunal justice is inevitably
symbolic; a few war criminals stand for a much larger group of
guilty individuals. Thus, what is billed as individual justice can
actually become a de facto way of exonerating many of the guilty.
Clearly, the idea that war crimes tribunals will individualize guilt is
fraught with ambiguity. In practice, the logistical and political
obstacles to a complete accounting tend to spare many perpetrators,
32. Albright, supra note 25.
33. GERARD PRUNIER, RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE 342 (1995).
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collaborators, and bystanders. This is useful, insofar as it lessens tile
danger of nationalist backlash; but it is hardly anything for court
advocates to tout or cheer about.
E. ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH
People argued that war crimes trials are useful because they
establish both historical record and truth vis-Ai-vis alleged atrocities.
Certainly, the absence of a well-established historical record
facilitates the denial that atrocities ever occurred. However, tribunals
have no monopoly on truth telling. Ultimately, the purpose of such
trials is not to determine an absolute truth, but rather to establish
guilt or innocence and punish accordingly. Rules of evidence may
limit or exclude information that would add to an historical record.
Consequently, trials do not necessarily establish the definitive record
or chronology of objective fact. Current negotiations on evidentiary
rules for the ICC would bar witness' statements from public
disclosure. Indeed, in many countries torn asunder by war and
violence, domestically-authorized truth commissions do a much
better job of creating an objective and truthful historical record, as
well as reconciling victims, to the extent possible, with their
tormentors.
A popular view among contemporary political analysts is that an
historical inquiry and record that assimilates the evil past is
necessary to restore the collective in periods of radical political
change. Establishing the "truth" about the state's past wrongs can
serve to lay the foundation of the new political order:
[S]uccessor government[s] [have] an obligation to investigate and
establish the facts so that the truth be known and be made part of the
nation's history. ... There must be both knowledge and
acknowledgement: the events need to be officially recognized and
publicly revealed. Truth-telling ... responds to the demand of justice for
the victims [and] facilitates national reconciliation. 34
34. Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report in STATE CRIME: PUNISIMIENT OR
PARDON 4-5 (1989); see also Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as
Justice: Investigatoi
, 
Commission in Latin America, 20 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY
79, 93-113 (1995) (evaluating success of truth commissions in Latin American
countries); Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political
Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights
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To the extent it is necessary for national healing, these
commissions and similar vehicles for truth gathering provide a more
comprehensive and holistic view of the repressive tragedies of prior
autocratic regimes than war crimes tribunals. Reports by these
commissions serve as a device to shift the society out of a tragic past
into the hopeful future of openness, freedom, and democracy.
Honduras, El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and
most of the countries of eastern Europe have all used this mechanism
to heal the past, learn the lessons so as not to repeat them, and serve
as a catalyst for liberalizing political change to democratic
government.
F. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, AVERTING VENGEANCE
The most offered final justification states that the alternative to an
international criminal court is a domestic tribunal more interested in
vengeance than justice-often in an untamed form that is more
destabilizing than international trials. It is argued that an impartial
international tribunal is preferable to national prosecutions or
vigilantism. National prosecution may not be legalistic; instead, it
may result in highly politicized trials (as in Croatia) or show trials (as
in Serbia). The pressure of trying war criminals may overwhelm
national judicial systems (as in Rwanda), or it may simply prefer
revenge to legalism. Under this justification, justice of a sort will be
done. The question is whether it will be the fine-tuned response of a
war crimes tribunal or the "crude" alternative of a national court
subject to domestic political pressures for revenge rather than justice.
Such a justification ignores the historical record of societies or
nations in turmoil that collectively opted for forgiveness and
amnesty, instead of trials or vigilantism to deal with the individuals
who committed human rights abuses. Uruguay is one such example."
Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425, 1429-31, 1437 (1992) (arguing that a country
can best heal when a newly elected government investigates human rights
violations perpetrated by former governments).
35. See generally P. Hayer, Fifteen Truth Commissions~ 1974-1994: A
Comparative Study,, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 616 (1994) (demonstrating that the
Uruguayan President opposed even a limited investigation of the former military
regime's human rights abuses). Numerous cases used amnesties to bring about
reconciliation and ultimately peace. Amnesty laws were passed in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua. Spain, Suriname, and Uruguay.
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In 1984, after years of military dictatorship, Uruguay negotiated a
return to democracy; however, the document that codified the
political transition did not address the oppressive crimes committed
by the military. Consequently, when attempts were made to
prosecute, the military pressured the government to enact an amnesty
law, which it did in 1986.36 There was enormous popular indignation
over the amnesty law, and the families of the victims launched a
successful petition campaign for a plebiscite on the law.
Nevertheless, by a narrow margin, the people of Uruguay voted to
uphold the amnesty law.37 Consequently, investigations into human
rights abuses and all trials then under way ended. A majority of the
Uruguayan people believed that this was necessary for national
reconciliation and to preserve the peace.38 The results over the last
sixteen years have borne out the wisdom of this action.
A permanent tribunal may actually end up undermining the case of
human rights by diverting resources from those nations trying to
confront past abuses or prevent new ones. For example, the money
spent by the U.N. tribunal in Rwanda would be better spent
modernizing Rwanda's judiciary or contributing to the development
of civil society. Instead, Rwanda struggles to prosecute tens of
thousands of prisoners charged with human rights abuses who will
languish in jail for years before being brought to trial.
Frankly, it is difficult to see how an ICC prosecutor would agree
not to prosecute a tyrant granted amnesty or clemency as part of a
peace negotiation. The ICC, as the sole arbiter of its discretionary
power, may deprive a state of its healing process as it transitions
from authoritarian to democratic institutions. Few would argue that
amnesties, as well as punishment, play a constructive role in shaping
the political transformation of a nation. Granted, representatives of
the soon-to-be-replaced regime often negotiate amnesties with the
opposition. However, although these pacts may well be a product of
Id.
36. See Eugene Robinson, Uruguay Vote Affirms Amnesty jbr Military:
Opponents Called Plebiscite to Reverse Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1989, at A2 I
(discussing enactment of amnesty law in Uruguay).
37. See id. (reporting results of the amnesty law plebiscite in Uruguay).
38. See id. (showing that proponents of the amnesty law hoped to put the past
behind so that Uruguay can move forward).
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bargaining and non-legislative processes, they are generally ratified
through more participatory processes over the course of the
transition.3 9
There is a very real danger that the prospect of war crimes
tribunals could, in fact, serve to perpetuate a war or destabilize post-
war efforts to build a secure peace. Indeed, as Raymond Aron has
argued, war becomes even more brutal:
Would statesmen yield before having exhausted every means of
resistance, if they knew that in the enemy's eyes they are criminals and
will be treated as such in case of defeat? It is perhaps immoral, but it is
most often wise, to spare the leaders of an enemy state, for otherwise
these men will sacrifice the lives and wealth and possessions of their
fellow citizens or their subjects in the vain hope of saving themselves. If
war as such is criminal, it will be inexpiable. 40
It is worth contemplating the likelihood of those then in power
relinquishing their control if the only alternative awaiting them was
an international trial and jail. If the world's dictators realize that
amnesty or exile deals are worthless in the face of an indictment
from the ICC, then a useful tool for a state's transition to democracy
is blunted. Miscreants will be less willing to cede power or call off
violence if they cannot trust promises of immunity. For example,
would there be any chance of ending the bloodletting in Algeria,
which so far has cost over 100,000 lives, if the ICC could ignore the
recently brokered amnesty plan?4 Or, if the junta in Myanmar
39. See, e.g., Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1995/act95-
034.html (establishing truth commission and granting amnesty to war crimes
leaders in South Africa, and explaining that in South Africa, the amnesty debates
were part of the Parliamentary debates relating to the adoption of the country's
1993 Constitution); see also Americas Watch Committee, Challenging Impunity:
The Ley de Caducidad and the Referendum Campaign in Urugua)y, AN AMERICAS
WATCH REPORT [A.W.R.] 15-16 (1989). Recently, Algerians proposed a rebel
amnesty plan to put an end to the killing and violence and bring reconciliation. See
Howard Schneider, Algerians Approve Rebel Aniuesty Plan: Measure Aimed at
Ending Civil Warfare, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1999, at A 17 (reporting that most
Algerians want peace and reconciliation after seven years of conflict).
40. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 115 (1966).
41. See Schneider, supra note 39 (estimating death toll in Algerian civil war).
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(Burma) believes that the ICC will hold it accountable, what
incentive does the junta have to relinquish power to the forces of
democracy? Given the choice, would Chinese dissidents rather have
those responsible prosecuted for the massacre at Tiananmen Square
or give them safety in exile in return for a democratic China?
Furthermore, "[w]ithout a credible guarantee that they will remain
unmolested abroad, dictators may well decide that they are better off
in their presidential palaces with their security apparatus to protect
them. If the people rise up, the obvious course will be to fire on the
crowds rather than flee. '42 A former Polish Solidarity leader
explained the prospect of prosecution for crimes against humanity
will not persuade a dictator to embark on the path of democracy
since that path inexorably leads to incarceration or worse.4 3 There
are, he declared, "two paths from dictatorship: the path of Pinochet
and the path of Ceaucescu. . . . 'I choose Pinochet. ''44
The abstract ideal of an international judicial system established to
right all wrongs has the real potential to upend internal political
settlements negotiated to achieve national tranquility and strain
otherwise good relations within the community of nations. Spanish
magistrate Carlos Escobar's attempt to arrest General Pinochet, and
his colleague Baltasar Garzon's arrest warrant for former leading
members of the Argentine military dictatorship each resulted in
political upheaval in Chile and Argentina, respectively. 5
It is easy to sit comfortably thousands of miles away and demand
justice, but it can come at a very high price in countries slowly
emerging from tyranny, such as Yugoslavia, Chile, South Africa, El
42. Marc A. Thiessen, How Not to Get Rid of Dictators: No Tyrant Will Be
Willing to Give up Power if He Ends up on Trial, WKLY. STANDARD, July 17,
2000, at 16.
43. See id. (arguing that ICC prosecutions harm rather than facilitate a
transition to democracy).
44. Id. At some point nations may decide that their democratic institutions are
stable enough to authorize their prosecutors to indict and their courts to try former
dictators. It took ten years for Poland to bring charges against former dictator
Jaruzelski. See generally Marek Matraszek, Jarazelski: To Forgive and Forget,
WARSAW Bus. J., May 21, 2001.
45. See Argentine President Vows to Reject Spanish Warrants (Santiago
Television Nacional de Chile Imagen Nacional, Nov. 3, 1999) (on File with
author).
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Salvador, and Poland. These countries have wisely eschewed justice
in the name of social peace because unless one achieves "absolute"
victory, similar to the Allies in World War II, it is extremely unlikely
that the victors can impose absolute justice. This could require a
compromise-even tolerating the intolerable-unfortunate as it may
be. Of course, the ICC, following the example of the Yugoslav
tribunal, would reject any such compromise, insisting that all
indicted miscreants come before the bar for its brand of justice no
matter what the social and political costs. Such trials jeopardize not
only ultimate justice, but also the more precious value of social
peace.
III. THE STATUTE OF THE NEW COURT:
FRONTAL ASSAULT ON SOVEREIGNTY?
"If the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court...
the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent,
practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent
tribunal."
-Abraham Lincoln
4 6
It is not the purpose of this essay to critique every provision of the
proposed statute.47 Only the more egregious and problematic issues
are discussed here. NGOs and many national delegates to the Rome
Conference, who were enamored with the idea of a world criminal
court, disregarded the pleas of more thoughtful nations to fully
address some very difficult issues. Nothing, not even the danger of
losing their own national concepts of justice and law, could stop
these coalitions from creating the ICC.
Even assuming that the concept of an international court is sound,
many provisions in the statute should have raised concerns, even
46. First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), il TilE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at 268 (Roy Basler, ed.) (1953).
47. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. lNrr'L L. 22 (1999) (analyzing individual
articles of Rome Statute); Michael N. Schmitt & Peter J. Richards, Into Uncharted
Water: The hIternational Criminal Court. 53 NAVAL WAR C.R. 93 (2000)
(dissecting and analyzing provisions of Rome Statute).
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among its most ardent supporters. Of course, given the haste by
which the delegates ratified the statute, it is not surprising that there
were substantive concerns.48 Since the statute prohibits reservations
under Article 120,49 even states ostensibly in favor of the court may
find themselves unable to ratify it because of the sovereignty and
domestic legal concerns that arise.
A. JURISDICTIONAL LEVIATHAN: THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?
The germ of dissolution of... government is in the constitution of the
judiciary; an irresponsible body, .. . working like gravity by night and by
day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its
noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be
usurped from the states, and the government of all be consolidated into
one. 50
-Thomas Jefferson
One of the most dangerous concepts enshrined in the statute,
cleverly disguising the primacy of the Court's jurisdiction, is a
concept called "complementarity. '' 5' Article 1 states that the Court's
power is limited by the principle of complementarity; that is, a
national court's jurisdiction and authority take precedence over ICC
jurisdiction. 2 However, nations lulled into a false sense of hope that
their judicial systems would always prevail in a battle of jurisdictions
should take note of Articles 17 and 20. These articles allow the ICC
48. See Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 14, at 10-11 (describing how the
delegates in Rome literally voted on a statute for the new court without reading the
document).
49. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute on the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 120, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute, or the Statute].
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond (Aug. 18, 1821), in
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1854-1915, at 331-32 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds.) (1903).
51. See Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed
International Criminal Court, 311 Cato Institute Policy Analysis (1998), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-31 I.html (defining the "complemetarity"
concept as one in which the ICC complements, but does not replace, national
criminal justice systems).
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, at art. I.
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to take jurisdiction if the state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or
if the proceedings are "conducted in a manner, which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice."53 The Statute defines "unwillingness" as an
attempt to shield the concerned from criminal responsibility, an
unjustified delay, or an obvious lack of independence or impartiality
that would reflect an inability to do justice. - Who makes these
determinations? The Court will act, in effect, as a supranational
judicial body. Moreover, "[t]he ICC will become an unavoidable
participant in the national legal process because it will set precedents
regarding what it considers 'effective' and 'ineffective' domestic
criminal trials."55
Given this extraordinary power, the ICC will become the
"Supreme Court" of all national legal systems. Either a state adopts
the decisions of the ICC or risks having its cases called up for
"international criminal" prosecution. For example, in the United
States, illegally seized evidence is generally inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding. In most common law countries, however,
illegally seized evidence is admissible, the nature of its seizure going
to its weight versus its admissibility. Whereas a U.S. court would
acquit an alleged war criminal due to illegally acquired evidence, the
ICC could deem the American system ineffective and thus require
that person be delivered to the ICC for trial. Other idiosyncrasies of
national criminal systems could also fall under ICC scrutiny and
judgment. The court could, for example, ignore or discount the
protections crafted by a nation and its people to ensure the rights of
all its citizens-including the guilty.
With most nations, the thought of trading national sovereignty and
the rights enshrined in domestic law to the whims of international
bureaucrats and jurists (with no understanding or interest in the
cultural values that make up a domestic criminal justice system)
should create sufficient concern to warrant hesitation and engender
an informed debate before ratification, even if the concept of an ICC
53. Id. arts. 17, 20.
54. Id. art. 17.
55. See Dempsey, supra note 51 (warning that the ICC will infringe on state
sovereignty as it slowly expands its jurisdictional authority and its decision
produce national repercussions).
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is politically attractive.
But apologists for the court argue that "[o]utmoded traditions of
state sovereignty must not derail the forward movement" to creating
this court.5 6 Legal scholar Sandra Jamison argues that nations must
prepare to cede some of their traditional sovereignty in pursuit of a
potent international criminal court. "The absolute doctrine that a state
is supreme in its own authority, and need not take into account the
affairs of other nations," she says, "is no longer tenable."57 Similarly,
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's minister of foreign affairs, maintains
that:
(There is] an acute dilemma for the United Nations, which finds itself torn
between intervening in severe humanitarian crises and respecting national
sovereignty. To date, it has responded largely on an ad hoc basis,
although always with the terrible lessons of Central Africa and the former
Yugoslavia in mind. Gradually, though, new ways of thinking are
emerging that address this dilemma .... A key element of this new
thinking is what has been called "human security." Essentially, this is the
idea that security goals should be primarily formulated and achieved in
terms of human, rather than state, needs .... We start from the premise
that the threat to life and limb of millions of individuals should take
precedence over military and national security interests.
58
And, as one Court advocate candidly admitted, the ICC "cannot be
achieved without impinging upon the traditional criminal jurisdiction
of states, but the values concerned are important enough to justify
this intrusion. 59
56. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Address at the Rome Conference at the Pace
Peace Center (June 16, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616ppc.htm (asserting conventional power
structures of stronger nations must consider the need for universal justice in places
such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
57. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A
Proposal That Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419,
432 (1995) (reasoning that an international criminal court would allow nations to
prosecute crimes that were formerly out of their power).
58. Lloyd Axworthy, The New Diplomacy: The U.N., the International
Criminal Court, and the Human Security Agenda, address at the Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University (Apr. 25, 1998), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/98 state/98_030e.htm.
59. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementaritv: Reconciling the
Jurisdiction of the National Courts and bIternational Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALIF
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Actually, the concept of "complementarity" argues against
creating the ICC in the first place. If most national judicial systems
are capable of addressing the substantive crimes the statute
proscribes, then a supranational judicial tribunal is only necessary in
cases where a national judicial system breaks down. Indeed, the ICC
would likely supplant judicial systems in precisely those countries-
such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and possible Cambodia-where the
international community should encourage the disputing parties to
find a comprehensive solution through their own domestic
administration of justice. Removing key elements of the dispute-
especially those emotional and contentious issues dealing with war
crimes and crimes against humanity-undercuts the process of
reconciliation and social justice that both victims and perpetrators
need to cooperate under if they are ever to live peacefully together.
In fact, the situation in Bosnia illustrates how an international
tribunal can be a part of the problem-not the solution. During the
Dayton Peace Accords discussions, no one addressed the possibility
of the Bosnians trying their own war criminals. The reason was that
the Dayton Accords simply papered over the underlying causes of
the current (and future) conflict. Moreover, since the Yugoslav
Tribunal was already in existence, no one wanted to modify the
mandate of the court, even if the parties could have reached an
agreement on war crimes prosecutions.
Not only did the Yugoslav tribunal fail to contribute to a
comprehensive solution in Bosnia, it arguably inhibited such a result.
The recent arrest by national authorities of former Serbian leader
Milosevic for embezzlement and other domestic crimes may actually
exemplify the best solution. Milosevic reportedly surrendered after
being promised by the new government that he would be tried by a
domestic court rather than the international court. The resulting trial
in a local court could prevent further polarizing an already fractured
society. Major segments of Serbian society see any effort to send
Milosevic to The Hague as a political move, an attempt to "blame the
Serbian people alone for the breakup of Yugoslavia and for causing
all the wars and atrocities."6 When Milosevic was subsequently
J. INT'L L. 383, 434-35 (1998).
60. Steven Erlanger & Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Gave Up After 1ow fe'll Get a
Fair Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at Al.
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handed over to the Yugoslav court for trial, over seventy percent of
the Serbs deemed the tribunal "illegitimate," while forty-eight
percent approved of his defiant attitude toward the court. " It is
difficult to see how either the ICC or the Yugoslav court can make
an already difficult and painful national transformation any smoother
or less painful. On the contrary, many, including those in the current
government, see future trials as "witch hunts." Such trials are likely
to embarrass past and current political leaders, Western leaders and
diplomats, and foment further polarization and discontent among the
population.62
The experience of the Rwanda war crimes tribunal is even more
discouraging. There, widespread corruption and mismanagement in
that tribunal's affairs led many to hope that the tribunal would expire
quietly before doing more damage. Equally troubling is the clear
impression that score settling among Hutus and Tutsis is the
principle focus of the Rwanda tribunal. In fact, with tens of
thousands awaiting war crimes prosecutions, one wonders whether
the tribunal is not simply genocide by other means. In addition to the
Bosnia and Rwanda examples, there is also the example of Iraq
where the absence of a tribunal further demonstrates the risks of a
permanent court. Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait
unquestionably qualifies as an unjustifiable act of aggression, and
there is little debate that the Iraqis committed numerous illegal acts.
Yet, by conscious decision, neither the United States nor any other
power, including Kuwait, has seriously sought to create a war crimes
tribunal for crimes in the Persian Gulf War.
The reasons are straightforward. Unlike Nuremberg, the goal of
the victorious coalition in the Persian Gulf never was the
unconditional surrender of Saddam Hussein and his removal from
power. Indeed, if that had been the goal, there would not have been a
coalition of nations because neither Syria nor Saudi Arabia were
interested in removing Hussein from power and both worried about
61. See David Holley, The Myth That Is Milosevic: Even A1ier Defiat. the
Former Yugoslav President 's Supporters See flin as a Hero Who Epitomizes the
Nation's Cult of Victinood, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2001, Al (detailing popular
sentiment about Milosevic).
62. See Steven Erlanger, A Wider Debate About the Role of Milosevic, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at A8.
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the precedent it would set. Accordingly, the coalition did not destroy
the existing government of Iraq, its forces never occupied Iraqi
territory any longer than was necessary, and they had no plans to
transform Iraqi society from a dictatorship to a democracy. Thus,
from the coalition's military perspective, war crimes trials formed no
part of the long-range strategy. Over ten years later, one can only
imagine how much more problematic negotiations over compliance
would be with Iraq giving up most of its leadership in war crimes
trials, in addition to complying with its other obligations under U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
Finally, under Article 15, an unaccountable and independent
prosecutor can initiate an investigation on his or her own
determination. 63 To those that think such power will be exercised
with restraint and in accordance with customary and currently
accepted notions of international law, let alone domestic legal
protections, one need only look at the current criminal tribunal for
Yugoslavia for enlightenment. Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
recently announced that NATO's use of, "depleted uranium
munitions fall within our jurisdiction, because if the reports and fears
of recent days proved founded, [their use] will constitute a war
crime, and our tribunal has jurisdiction over war crimes." This
claim does not square with the law of armed conflict under either the
Geneva Conventions or customary international law. An aggressive
prosecutor, in pursuit of his or her own notions of the law and in
concert with a sympathetic tribunal, could severely inhibit the
legitimate conduct of foreign relations, alter customary international
law, and even further restrict a nation's sovereign rights.
63. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 15 (detailing the power of the
prosecutor with respect to pre-trial investigations).
64. Depleted Uranium: Hague War Crimes Prosecutor Not Ruling NA TO Trial
Out, ROME LA REPUBBLICA, Jan. 14, 2001 at 14 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
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B. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION RUN AMOK?
Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for
it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice....
[P]erhaps you may consider whether the remedy [for injustice] will not be
worse than the evil.
-Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience 65
Interestingly, under Article 124 of the ICC statute, a government
may claim a seven-year exemption from the Court's jurisdiction for
war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory. 66 Further,
the Court has no jurisdiction over offenses occurring before the
treaty comes into effect or over offenses occurring before ratification
for states that become parties after that date.67 Such a rule allows
state parties to immunize nationals from prosecution for new crimes,
but nationals of nonparties remain subject to prosecution no matter
when new crimes are added or where they are located. As the U.S.
delegate David Scheffer put it, "[flor a criminal court, this is an
indefensible overreach of jurisdiction. ' 68 It represents a radical
development in the law of treaties, inconsistent with the fundamental
principle that only states party to a treaty are bound by its terms.9
Nevertheless, Article 12 extends the jurisdiction of the ICC to
anyone, anywhere in the world, even without a referral by the
Security Council or an established principle of customary
international law.70 The concept of universal jurisdiction over some
65. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 225, 231
(Owen Thomas ed., 1966) (1866).
66. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 124 (providing seven-year
transitional period for states wishing to declare they do not accept the jurisdiction
of the Court concerning crimes mentioned in article 8).
67. See id., art. II (establishing jurisdiction ratione temporis).
68. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 20.
69. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, arts. 34-38, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 ("A treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATI.ES
sec. 324 (1987) (following the rules set forth by Articles 34-37 of the Vienna
Convention).
70. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 12 (establishing jurisdiction
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crimes-for example genocide-does not apply to all the offenses
listed in the ICC statute, nor does it envision the possibility that the
jurisprudence of the court may cause the understanding of the
offense to shift over time. As David Scheffer argues, "[tihe crimes
within the court's jurisdiction... go beyond those arguably covered
by universal jurisdiction, and court decision or future amendments
could effectively create 'new' and unacceptable crimes. '7"
No doubt, the court will eventually add new offenses-offenses
that are unlikely have the stature of established customary
international law. This is an unprecedented change in the sources of
national lawmaking, one that further diminishes the traditional notion
of state sovereignty. The ICC's claim to jurisdiction over the
nationals of any state that has not joined this treaty is entirely
unsupported in accepted rules of international law. In fact, there is no
precedent in international law or practice for the exercise of
jurisdiction by such a court over the nationals of a state that has not
acceded to the treaty creating the court.
This should be of fundamental and singular importance to every
state considering ratification, because it goes to the heart of the
nation-state-centric international system. To accept the proposition
that "like-minded states" can now obligate other states, by a treaty
they have not signed or agreed to, portends a fundamental shift in the
international system and the beginning of the end of state
sovereignty. As one critic noted:
In attempting to subject a [nation's nationals] to the jurisdiction of the
ICC, the ICC states are in fact attempting to act as an international
legislature, a power they do not have and a power that is fundamentally at
odds with the guarantee of sovereign equality of States memorialized in
the United Nations Charter.7
2
preconditions).
71. Scheffer, supra note 2, at 18.
72. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court ii the U.S. National Interest?,
Hearing Before the Subconn. on Int'l Operations of the Conlin. on Foreign
Relations U.S.S., 105th Cong. 724 (1998) (statement of Lee A. Casey, Attorney,
Hunton & Williams, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Casey Hearing].
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C. CEDING POWER TO THE NEW COURT: SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
I will go to a war crimes tribunal ... when Americans are tried for
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Cambodia, Panama!
-Zeljko Rasnatovic, indicted war criminal 71
I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.
Fortunately, we were on the winning side.
-American General Curtis LeMay after WW11
74
Article 5 describes the subject matter jurisdiction of the court as
"the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole. 7 5 What those crimes are exactly is subject to continuing
disagreement. The Conference, for example, was unable to agree on
the definition of the crime of "aggression," one of the four categories
of crimes-the others being crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes. Additionally, the definitions of other categories of
crimes are far broader than those recognized in customary
international law. At the Rome Conference and subsequently, NGO
activists advocated that "experts" pontificating about what the law
"ought to be" can create "instant" customary international law based
merely on pronouncements from hastily arranged conferences. Such
experts are, of course, prime candidates to serve as judges and
prosecutors for the court. The court will then legislate new law in
accordance with what judges and prosecutors think the law "ought to
be." We have seen this inclination even in the International Court of
Justice. In the words of ICC proponent, Professor Theodor Meron:
[The Court has a] tendency to ignore, for the most part, the availability of
evidence of state practice ... and to assume that noble humanitarian
principles that deserve recognition as the positive law of the international
community have in fact been recognized as such by states. The "ought"
merges with the "is," . . . [I]t may well be that, in reality, tribunals have
73. The World Tries Again: Making Rules/br War, ECONOMIST, Mar. II, 1995,
at 23.
74. Richard Rhodes, The General and World War III, NEW YORKER, June 19,
1995, at 48.
75. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 5 (outlining the four categories of
crimes as being "(a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War
crimes; (d) The crime of aggression").
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been guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by the degree of
offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity: the more heinous the act,
the more the tribunal will assume it violates not only a moral principle of
humanity but also a positive norm of customary law.7 6
This is the case even where, in practice, there is no "positive norm
of customary law." The ICC will, essentially, be unfettered in its
ability to decide when alleged "crimes" are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court, as long as they reasonably fit within one of the many
vague and broad definitions of crimes contained in the statute. Once
constituted, the court will articulate its own interpretation of
international law-one that, no doubt, is designed to reduce the
discretion and flexibility of nations. The list of crimes, as vague as it
may be, is only the starting point and is illustrative of more crimes to
come. Proponents have already put forvard proposals to add more
crimes and to expand the vague definitions in order to cover radical
agendas for social change.
This essay will briefly analyze each of the categories. The intent is
not to provide an in-depth study, but to demonstrate how the Rome
statute delineates vague and ill-defined categories. In turn, this essay
demonstrates how these categories give the court extraordinary
powers to define crimes, notwithstanding state practice or the
collective will of states, as reflected by the actions or statements of
the U.N.
IV. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Defining aggression proved to be so difficult that the conference
decided to wait until the statute's seven-year waiting period for
amendment has elapsed before taking up this problem. Interestingly,
under the U.N. Charter," the Security Council is the sole body
authorized to determine when a state's acts amount to aggression and
respond accordingly. Allowing an independent ICC to adjudicate the
crime of aggression would infringe on the prerogative of the Council
and have the effect of second guessing the decisions of the Council.
Conceivably, for example, the ICC could acquit an individual
76. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customanr- Law, 81 AM. J.
IN'L L. 348, 361 (1987).
77. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
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responsible for acts the Council previously agreed constituted
aggression. In effect, the ICC could become the final judge of all
international acts, including those of the U.N., even to the point of
declaring illegal acts agreed to by that body reflecting the will of the
international community. In other words, eighteen judges will be in a
position to dictate to the world at large what is acceptable conduct
under their notions of international law-unconstrained and
unaccountable.
V. THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
One element of the definition of genocide includes an aspect of
mental distress that the United States rejected when it ratified that
treaty and passed enabling legislation to carry it out. However, given
the statute's Article 120 bar to reservations, the statute's definition
and the court's interpretation of that definition would control over
domestic law.8 In effect, to accept the statute, the United States
would have to reverse the position it took vis-At-vis the Genocide
Convention. Other nations had similar concerns, but as with all
issues of jurisdiction the court will be the final arbiter on the
obligations a nation has incurred upon ratification.
Once ratified, this statute subjects a nation to the unreserved
judgment of the court. It supercedes all domestic laws and nullifies
any domestic act inconsistent with its terms. Who knows how far the
court could reach in its efforts to stop the crime of genocide. It is
conceivable that it could require a nation to go to war to prevent one
nation from killing the nationals of another nation. A nation's public
officials and individual citizens could be prosecuted and punished for
causing mental harm (and who defines what that is?) to members of
the nation's ethnic, racial, or cultural group. Potentially, a charge of
any kind of discrimination or unfairness could fall under the court's
jurisdiction.
A. WAR CRIMES
The United States and others argued that the statute should define
war crimes as those already existing in customary international law.
78. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 120.
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Conversely, other delegations in Rome argued against limiting the
court's jurisdiction to crimes that have merely "attained the status of
customary international law."79 Instead, they argued that jurisdiction
should encompass all violations of humanitarian law. The scope of
such violations would be determined by an as yet unquantified
plurality of states and international legal experts who advocate what
the law should be as opposed to what currently exists as law in the
community of nations. Under this view, limiting the court's
jurisdiction to the current state of customary international law was
considered both unnecessary and counterproductive.
The wholesale adoption of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions in Article 8 as customary international law-despite its
explicit rejection by the United States and others and numerous
reservations by many other nations-is dangerous and troubling. The
introduction of many vague provisions"0 into the statute should raise
serious concerns with any state contemplating ratification, even those
that have ratified Additional Protocol I. The statute did not adopt
reservations over the Additional Protocol. This is potentially
troubling to any state contemplating ratification because of the "no
reservations" prohibition.8  The ratification of the ICC statute will
circumvent those sections of Additional Protocol I any state has
previously objected to.
Substantively, there are numerous other problems with the vague
delineation of "war crimes" in the statute. As a fundamental principle
of war, the use of force must be proportional to the military
advantage to be gained and take into account humanitarian concerns.
Humanitarian concerns, however, do not predominate, and military
forces are not required to suffer casualties or sacrifice the
79. HELEN DUFFY ET AL., JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: RECOMMI-NDATIONS FOR
AN INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 11 (1998).
80. There are a number of the Protocol's provisions that are impossibly vague
subject to definition through the subsequent practice of states. For example, the
standard that forbids "[d]estroying or seizing an enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war .... "
Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii). Also debatable is the standard of
"knowledge that [an] attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians... clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated .... Id., art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
81. Id., art. 120.
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accomplishment of their mission in order to protect civilians or limit
collateral damage. Of course, critics of current war-fighting object to
a strategy where the lives of combat pilots are valued so highly that
all bombs are dropped from a height at which the pilots are safe and
civilians are at greater risk. With the availability of "smart"
weaponry, which are capable of distinguishing between a barracks
and the hospital next door, activists argue that there is now a moral,
even legal, obligation to use these weapons to make such
distinctions. While it makes little sense to use a one or two million
dollar weapon against a thousand-dollar target, critics of the use of
force often claim that using anything other than precision guided
munitions violates the laws of armed conflict. So, as advances in
military technology lift the "fog of war" and facilitate surgical
strikes, the law of war may come to resemble the law of tort, with
combatants liable to be sued for negligence if they miss their
approved military target. Worse yet, combatants may be constantly
subjected to the ICC second-guessing over weapon and target
selection. In such a situation, a "wrong" decision is likely to result in
a commander and his civilian leadership facing prosecution for
failing to follow ICC decisional decrees.
The net effect of adopting the vague and ineffective standards of
Additional Protocol I will be to allow challenges to every command
decision made by a military force and subject it to impractical
standards that erode a force's ability to successfully prosecute a war.
Second-guessing long after the fog of battle lifts is an arm-chair
exercise well-suited to academics and theorists, but ill-suited to
military or political decision-makers whose failure to make correct
command decisions can endanger their own forces. Constraining the
ability to strike military targets by tilting the traditionally recognized
balance or imposing artificial constraints on the use of effective
weapons will result in protracted wars and more casualties and
destruction. It would be folly to subject a nation's military
operations-approved by the nation's leadership and a commander's
employment of them-to the continual interference and oversight of
an international tribunal or prosecutor with little understanding or
appreciation for the nature of warfare during an ongoing conflict. It
is hard to comprehend why a nation fighting for its vital national
security interests would place itself in such a position. In effect, a
nation is agreeing to allow an international court to second-guess its
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decisions and, if it disagrees, prosecute its leaders.
B. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Article 7 of the statute defines "crimes against humanity:"
[T]he following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder: (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of populations; (e) Imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender...; (i) Enforced disappearance...; (j)
the crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.82
Many of these "crimes," such as enforced disappearance,
apartheid, and sexual offenses other than rape, have never previously
fallen within the purview of the international tribunals.
Article 7 expands "persecution" to include "the intentional and
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international
law," 3 which is an incredibly vague standard that did not exist until
the establishment of the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals. It is
unclear just what would constitute an indictable example of gender
persecution. The same holds true for the amorphous crime of
"inhumane acts that intentionally cause great suffering or otherwise
seriously affect the victim's physical or mental health."" To take one
example, under the crimes against humanity definition, there is a
provision that would make it criminal to impose essentially
humiliating conditions on people based on their ethnicity. Again, this
is unprecedented in international law and it is subject to any kind of
meaning and application the court wishes to put on it.
Yet this vagueness and willingness to leave the interpretation of
these "crimes" to the ICC is exactly what many of the NGOs wanted.
82. Id., art. 7.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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Ignoring cultural ties as well as traditional domestic definitions and
standards, the clear intent of the statute was to give the court "the
flexibility to cover other crimes against humanity that may emerge
over time, not contemplated in the statute."85 Obviously, if the
Yugoslav tribunal is any indication, there is great potential for
politicization and overreaching. The Hague tribunal fundamentally
changed the definition of the term "war crime" itself, ruling that
international law applies not just in conflicts between states but also
in civil or internal conflicts. In certain circumstances, "citizenship" is
established through ethnicity and religion, as well as through
nationality. In convictions of guards at a Bosnian Muslim detention
center, it defined rape as a war crime. One radical NGO, for
example, in pushing a feminist agenda, went so far as to advocate
defining "sexual slavery" to include marriage and interdiction of
abortion as a crime against humanity.8 6 Given recent decisions of the
European Court of Justice, it is easy to imagine an ICC embracing
these new definitions.
C. THE ABSENCE OF OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL
National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law.
International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of
accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a political one.
-Kenneth Waltz
8 7
Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
-Lord Acton"
85. Sunmaij, of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute, HUMAN RIGihTS
WATCH, sec. 5, Sept., 1998, available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-statute.htm.
86. See Feminist Coalition Urges Naming Catholic Teaching on Abortion a
"Crine Against Humanity" in New World Court, CATHOLIC FAMILY & HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTE, Mar. 24, 2000, available at http://www.c-
fam.org/FAXlVolume_3/faxv3nl8.html (discussing a pamphlet released by the
Women's Caucus for Gender Justice).
87. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 113 (Random
House 1979).
88. BARON JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM
AND POWER 335 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1972) (writing a letter to Bishop
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The statute allows the court broad interpretative powers to
determine the law, even over the objection of a state and long-
standing state practice. Article 119 of the statute-probably the most
pernicious and dangerous of powers conferred on this court-
provides that "[a]ny dispute concerning the judicial functions of the
Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court." 9 This provision
is short, to the point, and troubling. Through its pronouncements and
appellate decisions, the court will serve as the final arbiter of the law
and force social changes on a nation and its society. State practice
could be declared illegal based on decisions favoring the practices of
other states, and the predilections of judges as influenced by
impassioned NGOs.
For example, thirty-four European countries signed the European
Convention on Human Rights, which bans the death penalty.
Countries who continue to use the death penalty are widely criticized
in Europe. The death penalty is designated an abuse on a par with
torture and genocide-that is, a crime against humanity. U.S.
President George W. Bush's support of the death penalty earned him
the title of "world champion executioner," and many NGOs in
Europe and elsewhere call his support of the penalty "criminal."' It
does not take much of a stretch to see a future court decision
declaring the death penalty a crime against humanity and authorizing
the prosecution of political leaders implementing such a policy.
Clearly, the potential of the ICC to affect the customs and laws of a
nation is immense.
If in doubt, one need only look at how the European Court of
Justice fundamentally changed a nation's social policies based on
that court's interpretation of the law. Great Britain was recently
required by the Court to lift it's ban against homosexuals in the
military, and Germany was ordered to open all jobs in the military to
women as a result of recent Court of Justice decisions." Whether one
Creighton on April 5, 1887).
89. Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 119.
90. T.R. Reid, Many Europeans See Bush As Executioner £Etraordinaire,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at A36.
91. See Peter Finn, German Wfonzen Gain Job Parity in the Militarl., WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2001, at A12 (discussing Germany's involuntary response to the
European Court of Justice's ruling that provisions in Germany's constitution,
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agrees with these decisions or not is irrelevant to the fact that a non-
domestic court, notwithstanding long-held beliefs and cultural
practices, chose to overrule a nation's people because it did not
comport with its perception of social justice.
Politically driven charges force a nation involved in armed conflict
to constantly defend itself against such politically motivated charges.
Not only will an opponent exploit past war crimes charges to
undermine a nation's credibility and future military operations, but
also one's allies will find it difficult to support already politically
sensitive missions if there is no independent resolution of such
charges. For example, Palestinians and other Arabs repeatedly cited
Israeli activities, such as the construction of settlements, as war
crimes. On October 1, 2000, the Arab League issued a communiqu6
following an emergency session in Cairo declaring that it held Israel
fully responsible for the deaths of Palestinians resulting from the
latest Intefada.92  The League called for "an international
investigation into the horrible crimes carried out against the
Palestinian people and the trial of the [Israeli officials responsible for
the deaths] before the International Criminal Court." 93 In a recent
emergency session, the U.N. Human Rights Commission determined
Israel guilty of "'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity'. . . in the
occupied Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem," and started its
own human rights investigation on all Israeli activities. 4 This is but
one more illustration of the dangerous and destabilizing potential of
an interloping court to make mischief during on-going efforts by
parties at conflict attempting to resolve their differences.
A number of advocates for the ICC criticized the United States for
refusing to initially sign the statute. A major part of the refusal of the
United States to agree to the creation of this court was not because
Americans should be treated differently than any other citizen of the
which prohibit women in the military, violate sexual discrimination rules of the
European Union).
92. See U.N. Probe of Israel Sought; Riots" Bring Appeal fromn Arab League,
THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 2., 2000, at A6 (describing the Arab
League's position on the Israeli-Palestinian clashes).
93. Id.
94. John R. Bolton, The U.N. Also Rises, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 30, 2000, at
12 (noting that this is the same commission that is routinely incapable of'
condemning China, Cuba, or even Yasser Arafat for human rights violations).
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world. This was a more fundamental issue-specifically, the
tradition of the people to distrust the consolidation of power into any
one organ (or person), particularly one totally unaccountable to any
democratically elected body. By its nature, power is capable of
abuse, and people are flawed. 95 The lack of trust in their leaders led
the drafters of the U.S. Constitution to impose a system of checks
and balances-a separation, if you will, of the powers subject to
abuse. As one of the drafters, James Madison, wrote:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary .... In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place, oblige it to control itself.96
Envisioned and codified by the statute, the ICC would act as
policeman, prosecutor, judge, and jury. State parties, under Article
93, are obligated to provide police, investigative, custodial, and other
professional services to the court as the court deems necessary. 7 Of
course, the state party involved bears the costs. The state's personnel,
with only bureaucratic divisions of authority, would perform all of
these functions. As noted above, there would be no appeal from its
judgments to any other authority. If the ICC abused its power, the
individual defendant would have no legal recourse. From first to last,
the ICC would be judge in its own case. While the Statute does
provide for an oversight body in Article 112,11 a two-thirds majority
must approve matters of substance." Given the fact that most of
95. See generally Chris Hawley, Report Says U.N-Paid Lalt'ers May be
Splitting Fees, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at 23 (commenting that even as this
article was being written, scandal has erupted over illegal splitting of fees among
defense lawyers and their clients at the Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes
tribunals).
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 1, at 235 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 1987).
97. See Rome Statute, supra note 49, art. 93 (enumerating investigation and
prosecution compliance measures required by the court).
98. See id., art. 112(4) (establishing the oversight mechanism to act as a
watchdog over the court).
99. See id., art. 112(7)(a) (providing that a two-thirds majority vote must be
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those with oversight responsibility would be sympathetic to
expanding the court's power, true oversight is unlikely. The ICC
would exercise the most fundamental power of government-the
administration of criminal justice. The rights of individuals before
the court, even those granted to them by their own country, will
depend entirely upon its will-good or bad.
CONCLUSION: THE TROUBLE WITH TRIALS IN
AN UNACCOUNTABLE COURT
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close
to home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of'
the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person: the
neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory,
farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man,
woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity
without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have
little meaning anywhere.
-Eleanor Roosevelt, 1958""(
We must not worry about committing an offence against the rights of
nations nor about violating the laws of humanity. Such feelings today are
of secondary importance....
-General von Falkenhayn, German Minister of War, 191411"
We live in a world in which justice is always imperfect. We strive
for an ideal conception of the rule of law and preservation of human
rights. However, we are oftentimes forced to recognize that they
must be balanced by the contingent political exigencies of particular
cases. States and regions moving from illiberal, authoritarian, and
repressive regimes to liberal democracies historically followed rule-
of-law principles tailored to the goal of their political transformation.
The ICC, as a distinctly undemocratic institution, fails to represent
the will of national and cultural identities, and makes a poor tool to
obtained to override the Court's judgment).
100. Eleanor Roosevelt, Remarks at the Presentation of In Your Hands to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, (Mar. 27 1958), available at
http://www.udhr50.org/history/inyour.htm.
101. GEORGE CLEMENCEAU, GRANDEUR AND MISERY OF VICTORY 279 (F.M.
Atkinson trans., 1930).
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help in this transformation. There is no single, correct response to a
state's repressive past. "Which response is appropriate in any given
regime's transition is contingent on a number of factors-the
affected society's legacies of injustice, its legal culture, and political
traditions-as well as on the exigencies of its transitional political
circumstances."' 0 2 The historical record indicates that trials are a
poor source for normative change. Change to rule-of-law
democracies is a product of contemporary political circumstances
and historical legacies of injustice.
What is paramount is the visible pursuit of remedy, of return, of
wholeness, of political unity-an impetus incorporating values
external to those of ideal theories of justice. Domestic judicial
systems, unlike the ICC, offer an alternative successor identity that
centers on political unity. They also offer a way to reconstitute the
collective-across divisive racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious
lines-that is grounded in a political identity arising from a society's
particular legacies of fear and injustice. While such an approach
requires an evolving critical self-understanding-again something
lacking in an ICC-it nonetheless draws on a juridical discourse of
rights and responsibilities that offers both a transcendent normative
vision and a pragmatic course of action.
It is not ideal, and it is even compromised. Yet it is informed by
and constructed from the conditions under which it is chosen.
Renewal is forged by letting go of the historical injustices and
moving from divisiveness to nation building, not interminable trials
constantly seeking an unattainable perfection of justice. Resorting to
settlements implies compromise, a collective decision to reconstitute
the community. To do so has a political dimension, forced
consensus, and an eschewing of some measure of individual
accountability for past crimes remembered but of necessity forgiven
in furtherance of the good for the collective whole.
Political compromise is also a sure sign of working democracies.
Those who advocate a new layer of bureaucratic legalism on
humanity such as the ICC, fail to understand-or totally ignore-that
justice will always have political ramifications. As states transform
into modern rule-of-law democracies with their own distinctive
102. RuTi G. TEITEL, TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 219 (2000).
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brands of justice, an international criminal court will no longer be
necessary.
The ICC, on the other hand, will permanently remove the
fundamental right of a nation and its people to choose how to deal
with the tragedies of repression and the horrors of war, and, contrary
to the claims of ICC advocates, will not bring closure, justice, or
healing. The prospect of years of trials, the re-opening of national
wounds, the stripping of a nation's ability to heal itself can only
serve the opposite end intended for the Court. As Nobel Laureate
Desmond Tutu eloquently explained South Africa's decision not to
pursue "war crimes" trials but instead go the route of a truth and
reconciliation commission:
The personal truth-.... "truth of wounded memories"-was a healing
truth and a court of law would have left many of those who came to
testify, who were frequently uneducated and unsophisticated, bewildered
and even more traumatized than before, whereas many bore witness to the
fact that coming to talk to the commission had had a marked therapeutic
effect on them.1
0 3
And so South Africa rejected the trial option. This third way was
to:
[G]rant amnesty to individuals in exchange for a full disclosure relating to
the crime for which amnesty was being sought. It was the carrot of
possible freedom in exchange for truth, and the stick was, for those
already in jail, the prospect of lengthy prison sentences and, for those still
free, the probability of arrest and prosecution and imprisonment. IN
But, of course, if the ICC existed, reconciliation, wound binding,
and closure would be impossible. An independent prosecutor and
court would have had to try all cases under its jurisdiction,
particularly if the state refused to try criminals as the price for
reconciliation and peace. Consequently, appeals by the new South
African Government to stop such prosecutions would undoubtedly
go unheeded because, after all, how could the world criminal court
treat one country differently from another?
103. DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESs 26-27 (1999).
104. Id. at 30.
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This court will be an international institution without checks or
balances, essentially unaccountable to any state or institution for its
actions, and without the possibility of appeal. The statute empowers
the court to sit in judgment of every nation's foreign policy. It
creates an independent prosecutor accountable to no government or
institution, and it represents a massive dilution of the United Nations
Security Council's powers. In short, this Statute represents a clear
and present danger to national sovereignty. This court strikes at the
heart and soul of nations, taking the fundamental power of law-
making away from individual countries and giving it to an
international judiciary.
In many respects, ICC advocates fundamentally confuse the
appropriate roles of political and economic power, diplomatic efforts,
military force, and legal procedures. No one disputes that barbarous
acts are unacceptable to civilized peoples. The real issue is how and
when to deal with these acts, and that is not simply, or even
primarily, a legal exercise. The ICC advocates make a fundamental
error by trying to transform matters of power and force into matters
of law. Misunderstanding the appropriate roles of force, diplomacy,
and power in the world is not just bad analysis, but bad and
potentially dangerous policy for any country.
Existing empirical evidence in the military sphere argues
convincingly that a weak and distant legal body will have no
deterrent effect on the likes of Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, or a future
Stalin. Holding out the prospect of ICC deterrence to those who are
already weak and vulnerable is simply fanciful. The court's
advocates mistakenly believe that the search for justice is
everywhere and always consistent with the attainable political
resolution of serious political and military disputes (whether between
or within states) and the reconciliation of hostile neighbors. In the
real world, as opposed to in theory, justice and reconciliation may be
consistent. Recent experience in situations as diverse as Bosnia,
Rwanda, South Africa, Cambodia, and Iraq argue in favor of a case-
by-case approach rather than the artificially imposed uniformity,
emblematic of the ICC. Realistically, what nation would honor an
ICC indictment of a Russian leader for war crimes committed in
Chechnya or Chinese leaders for crimes against humanity occurring
daily in China? Why would nations further complicate their foreign
relations with this type of conundrum?
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The protection of human rights and the punishment of those who
violate them are laudable goals, but in the conduct of world affairs it
is not the only thing or even the most important thing. Peace,
stability, social justice, and building the structures to engender a
transition to rule-of-law democracy are equally desirable and-
particularly in the short term-often more important. Unfortunately,
the court's supporters believe otherwise. They would willingly
sacrifice the international state-centric system that is, ultimately, the
best hope for achieving a peaceful world free of the scourge of
despots and the horrors of war. Worse, ICC advocates have an
unstated agenda resting fundamentally on the desire to assert the
primacy of international institutions over nation-states. Advocates of
the court have, of course, downplayed these dangers. But, as one
observer noted:
Unfortunately, support for the ICC concept is based largely on emotional
appeals to an abstract ideal of an international judicial system,
unsupported by any meaningful evidence, and running contrary to sound
principles of international crisis resolution. Moreover, for some, faith in
the ICC rests largely on an unstated agenda of creating ever more
comprehensive international structures to bind nation states .... o0
This should be unacceptable for any nation, and reason enough to
reject the court or embrace it only at their peril.
Nations, like their people, are not perfect. Justice and injustice
continue their ever-renewing fight for ascendancy in the affairs of
mankind. As one of America's great civil rights leaders presciently
wrote:
Salvation for a race, nation, or class must come from within. Freedom is
never granted; it is won. Justice is never given; it is exacted. Freedom and
justice must be struggled for by the oppressed of all lands and races, and
the struggle must be continuous, for freedom is never a final fact, but a
continuing evolving process to higher and higher levels of human, social,
economic, political and religious relationships. 10
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Ultimately, the best hope to stop the slaughter of innocents and the
horrors of atrocities is not through an unchecked, imperial
international court, but rather through all nations embracing
democratic institutions and the rule of law. Until that happy day,
democratic nations must continue to maintain the military and moral
strength necessary to deter, and unequivocally demonstrate that the
costs far outweigh any perceived gains for the illicit behavior and
inhumane acts rejected by all civilized nations.
